Since President Sadyr Japarov came to power in 2020, Kyrgyzstan has shifted closer to Russia while moving toward a harsher regime internally. The country was long marked by instability and frequent political upheavals; Japarov aimed to establish a centralized and strong government.
This trend became even more pronounced with Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan has become one of the main crypto hubs used in Moscow’s shadow trade. Behind this system is said to be oligarch Ilan Shor, wanted for a major bank fraud in Moldova. During the same period, Moscow and Shor reportedly established a propaganda network in the country under the name "Eurasia."
Closeness to Moscow Yields Limited Returns
Despite the Kyrgyz leadership’s close stance toward Russia, Bishkek’s concrete gains have been limited. Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia face similar pressures and discrimination as other Central Asian migrant workers. The most visible support from the Kremlin has been a few hundred school buses and plans to build nine Russian-language schools.
The text emphasizes that Kyrgyzstan has become one of the former Soviet countries closest to Moscow after the war, but this has not translated into strong economic or political benefits. The closeness between Kyrgyzstan and Russia largely takes the form of cautious silence and a policy of not provoking the other side.
"Neutrality" Rhetoric and Careful Balance
In his parliamentary remarks during the early days of the war, Japarov described the situation as complex and said that as a small country, they do not have the power to stop the conflict. In the same speech, he called for unity, mentioning rising food and fuel prices and the strengthening of the dollar.
This approach is described as Kyrgyzstan’s official neutrality line, but in practice, this neutrality is based on sensitivity not to upset Moscow and Beijing. The country prioritizes relations with Russia and China, as it does not expect major investments from the West.
Distance from the West, More Control at Home
One of the key points in Japarov’s political rise was the nationalization of the Kumtor gold mine from Canada-based Centerra Gold. The mine came fully under state control in 2022, but questions remain about how efficiently the new owners are managing it.
The government has increased oversight of foreign investments, restricted mining areas accessible to foreigners, and prepared a new Mining Law. However, it is proposed that English law be applied in investment disputes, and a special International Dispute Resolution Center based on English rules opened in February 2025 in the Tamchy investment area near Issyk-Kul.
A More Cautious Tone in Washington
The Kyrgyz leader took a backseat compared to other regional leaders at the first Central Asia-US summit. While Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev made notable remarks to Donald Trump and Uzbekistan’s leader Shavkat Mirziyoyev described Trump as the only person who could stop the Ukraine war, Japarov focused more on digital economy and artificial intelligence.
Japarov raised hydroelectric projects and preparations for the Kambarata power plant during talks but did not emphasize mining. This is seen as linked to Kyrgyzstan lacking mining assets that would attract the Trump administration’s interest.
Acceleration of Authoritarianism
According to the text, Kyrgyzstan has moved toward a stricter power centralization under Japarov. Citing Freedom House data, the country was rated "partly free" with 38 points in 2019 but fell to 25 points, classified as "not free."
The new constitution adopted during this period significantly expanded presidential powers, pushing the political structure toward a harsher and more vertical model. Thus, Kyrgyzstan is seen as working closely with Russia while adopting a less open and more controlled governance model domestically.
Migrants, Judiciary, and Contradictory Cases
Closer ties with Russia have not automatically eased conditions for Kyrgyz citizens. Those working or living in Russia face similar repression and discrimination as other Central Asian migrants, while some returning to Kyrgyzstan face threats of prosecution.
The story of Samat, a young Kyrgyz dual citizen, is given as an example. After completing military service, he signed a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry and tried to end it before the war started. However, when he returned to Bishkek in March 2022, he was identified through a wanted persons database at the airport and detained. His subsequent fate is unknown.
Meanwhile, some Kyrgyz fighting for Russia have been imprisoned, but sentences vary by case. Askar Kubanychbek uulu was sentenced to ten years for mercenary activities, later released on three years’ probation, and then returned to Russia to sign another contract with the Defense Ministry.
The overall picture shows Kyrgyzstan demonstrating loyalty to Russia while shifting toward a more closed and controlled political system at home. The closeness to Moscow returns to Bishkek not as strong external support but as a cautious balancing act and a growing foundation for authoritarianism.
