Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a fundamental change to the Chinese Communist Party's official historical narrative, according to Chinese writer and researcher Ding Yuen. In his article in Foreign Policy magazine, Yuen argued that Xi, in his July 1 speech, divided the party's history into four stages, officially ending the reform era initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
According to Yuen, Xi, in his speech on the party's 105th anniversary, classified history as revolution, construction, reform, and the 'new era.' This distinction separates the period that began with Xi's rise to power in 2012 from Deng's reform era and carries deep political significance.
The author recalls that reform and opening-up were previously seen as an ongoing phase. Noting that Xi had previously said reform was 'still on the way,' Yuen emphasizes that declaring the 'new era' as an independent stage means the reform era has officially ended.
According to the article, historical periodization within the Chinese Communist Party is closely tied to the distribution of political legitimacy. While Mao Zedong is identified with the revolution and state-building phases, the reform era is associated with Deng Xiaoping; this legacy is also shared by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Ding Yuen argues that Xi focuses on surpassing Deng's legacy rather than directly competing with Mao. The author, using the phrase 'If Deng answered the question "How can China become rich?", Xi presents himself as the one who answers "How can China become strong?"', points out that power and national security have been placed at the top of state priorities.
According to the author, declaring the end of the reform era does not mean that reform discourse has been completely abandoned. Although the Chinese leadership still puts forward plans to deepen reforms, reform is no longer a political value in itself or the name of a historical period; it has become a tool serving the goals of the 'new era' defined by Xi.
While Deng-era reforms encouraged gradually freeing the economy and society from political pressure, opening up to the world, and benefiting from Western experiences, Xi's reforms prioritize national security, party leadership, self-sufficiency, and Chinese modernization, increasing the party and state's control over the economy and society.
This transformation is also reflected in official discourse. Slogans such as 'liberate minds,' 'open up to the world,' and 'let some people get rich first' have been replaced by concepts like 'comprehensive leadership of the party,' 'security,' 'struggle,' 'self-confidence,' 'common prosperity,' and 'the rise of the East, the decline of the West.'
Ding Yuen notes that China has not abandoned the word 'reform' but has radically changed its meaning. According to him, reform, which for decades formed the basis of the ruling party's legitimacy, no longer determines China's present and future; it has become subordinate to the priorities of the 'new era.'
